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Earnings Returns to Education in Urban China: A Note on Testing Differences among 
Groups 
(Comment on Wu and Xie, ASR, June 2003) 
 
The finding that earnings returns to education are higher in the market sector than in the state 
sector in China’s transition economy is commonly attributed to the “more efficiently operating 
market mechanisms” with respect to the valuation of human capital (Wu and Xie 2003, 
henceforth WX, p. 426). However, WX “challenge the prevailing wisdom that education is 
necessarily more highly rewarded in the market sector” (p. 425). Based on an empirical analysis 
of this issue, WX instead conclude that the market does not reward educational investment 
differentially. 
 
Unfortunately, WX’s conclusion appears premature. As we illustrate below, WX’s conclusion is 
problematic mainly because of a general difficulty that exists in the interpretation of single 
pairwise tests in the analysis of the differences among three or more groups. The results of such 
comparisons can be ambiguous if the tests employed lack sufficient statistical power. WX 
compare the earnings returns to education among three different types of workers; however, they 
test only two out of the three possible group differences. Because the results of the omitted test 
are, in fact, at odds with the other results, WX’s viewpoint is biased and leads them to an 
unjustified conclusion. 
 
This comment is organized as follows. First, we briefly summarize WX’s argumentation and 
hypotheses and then replicate their analysis in order to illustrate its shortcomings. We will then 
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derive an alternative answer to WX’s research question while providing some general advice on 
how to address the problem of multi-group comparisons. 
 
WX’s Argumentation and Hypotheses 
 
WX argue that the higher returns to education observed in the market sector could be due to 
selection effects in the “process of sorting workers into labor markets” (p. 426) and therefore 
propose a typology of workers based on individuals’ labor-market histories. The worker types of 
interest are: (1) workers who have always been employed in the state sector (“stayers”), (2) 
workers who transferred to the nascent market sector early and stayed there (“early birds”), and 
(3) workers who were initially in the state sector but later switched to the market sector (“later 
entrants”). This typology is used to test competing hypotheses about the sources of observed 
differences between the two sectors in terms of returns to education. 
 
If higher returns to education are caused by marketization per se, then both later entrants and 
early birds should enjoy higher returns than stayers, “because all workers in the market sector are 
subject to the same market mechanisms” (Hypothesis 1, p. 430). However, according to WX, 
potentially confounding factors were at work in China in the later stages of the economic 
transition. In particular, relatively skilled workers among the better educated were attracted to 
the market sector by large payoffs and relatively unskilled workers among the less educated were 
“pushed to the market sector through layoffs” (p. 430), an unobserved heterogeneity that would 
result in returns to education in the market sector appearing greater than they actually are. WX 
thus conclude that, if the market does not in fact pay off, the observable returns to education 
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should be higher in the market only for later entrants and not for early birds (Hypothesis 2). WX 
summarize this argument as follows: 
 
The crucial difference between the two hypotheses is the treatment of early birds. 
In Hypothesis 1, early birds are grouped with later entrants because they share 
the common feature of being in the market sector. (…) In Hypothesis 2, early 
birds are grouped with stayers because the two types of workers were 
approaching a convergence, against which later entrants were selectively 
recruited into the market sector. (P. 430) 
 
WX also provide a graphical illustration of Hypothesis 2 (Figure 1:431). Note that the hypothesis 
depicted in their Figure 1, while not completely consistent with the description of Hypothesis 2 
in the text body, makes a related prediction, namely that the apparently higher earnings returns to 
education in the market sector will disappear as soon the time of entry into the labor market is 
controlled for through the worker typology (early birds vs. later entrants). Either way, the basic 
idea is that the earnings returns to education in the market sector are biased (upwards) due to the 
heterogeneous composition of work force in the market sector and that accounting for the 
proposed worker typology in the analysis will, at least for some of the types, eliminate this bias. 
 
Reanalysis and Criticism 
 
In order to evaluate the Hypotheses 1 and 2 empirically, WX use data from a 1996 sample of the 
labor force in urban areas of China and estimate standard earnings regression models including 
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interaction terms for worker type and education.1 The relevant part of the model can be 
represented as follows:  
 
log(Earnings)  = β0 + β1 Education + … + β6 Later entrants + β7 Early birds 
 + β8 Later entrants × Education + β9 Early birds × Education + ε 
 
The stayers are the reference group, i.e. β8 captures the difference between returns to education 
for later entrants and stayers and β9 the difference between returns for early birds and stayers.2 
The Model 1 column in Table 1 contains WX’s actual regression results (see Model 5c in their 
Table 4:437). Table 1 also contains a replication of their results, i.e. our own estimation based on 
the same data analyzed by WX (Model 2). The replication appears to be a reasonable 
approximation of the original estimates in Model 1.3 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
                                                 
1 The data are from the 1996 survey on “Life Histories and Social Change in Contemporary China” and are 
obtainable from http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/da/lhsccs/chinaweb.html. 
2 The use of interaction terms might appear to complicate matters, but they are not relevant to the problem discussed 
in this comment. The essential issue for our purposes is that differences among more than two groups are examined, 
be it with conditional means or in conditional slopes. 
3 Note that the results in Table 1 are based on the comprehensive measure of the market sector, whereas WX also 
report results based on the restrictive and broad measures (for the definitions see WX:432). However, the use of a 
particular measure does not substantially alter the findings discussed here. 
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The main result of Model 2 (as well as Model 1) is that the effect of education differs 
significantly between later entrants and stayers, but not between early birds and stayers: β8 is 
significant, but not β9. WX thus conclude that one can distinguish between later entrants with 
higher observed returns to education on the one hand and stayers and early birds with a lower 
education effect on the other. Consequently, WX suggest that Hypothesis 1 should be rejected in 
favor of Hypothesis 2: 
 
Our findings suggest that the commonly observed higher earnings and higher 
returns to education in the market sector compared with the state sector in China 
are due entirely to the earnings outcomes of later entrants. Early market entrants 
resemble workers in the state sector in both their level of earnings and returns to 
education. Thus, it appears that it is not the market per se that renders higher 
rewards to later market entrants. Otherwise, early birds would enjoy an 
advantage similar to later entrants. (P. 438) 
 
This interpretation does seem convincing at first sight. However, consider our Model 3 in Table 
1, in which the reference group has been switched from stayers to later entrants. The primary 
result in this model is that the effect of education differs significantly between stayers and later 
entrants, but not between early birds and later entrants. Thus, if Model 3 is interpreted 
analogously to the manner in which Model 2 was interpreted, the conclusion is that there are 
higher earnings returns to education for later entrants and early birds, while the stayers have 
lower returns. Based on Model 3, one would therefore draw the opposite conclusion and reject 
Hypothesis 2 in favor of Hypothesis 1. 
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Models 2 and 3 are simply two different representations of exactly the same estimates. Such 
contradictory conclusions therefore make no sense. The reason for the seeming inconsistency is 
that both of the models test only a subset of group differences explicitly. For example, Model 2 
tests later entrants and early birds against stayers, but does not test for differences between later 
entrants and early birds. One might argue that this is not a problem here because the two 
comparisons suffice to describe the relations among the three groups: If (1) A is different from C 
and (2) B is not different from C, then (3) A must be different from B (let A be the returns to 
education for later entrants, B those for early birds, and C those for stayers). Unfortunately, 
statistical tests do not allow this kind of inference. In the context of statistical testing, the true 
meaning of a statement like (2) is: “We do not know if B is different from C” (i.e., the hypothesis 
that B and C are equal cannot be rejected), and, thus, (3) does not follow from (1) and (2). Ergo, 
(3) must be tested explicitly. 
 
We know from Model 3 that Assertion (3) cannot be confirmed for the data in question—an 
important piece of information that was neglected in WX’s analysis; the assertion can also not be 
tested from the numbers provided in their paper. Thus, these data show neither that early birds 
have different returns to education than stayers nor that early birds have different returns than 
later entrants. In short, a lack of statistical power means that these results are inconclusive (a 
larger sample would eventually reveal a significant result for one or the other test and thus 
eliminate the inconsistency). There is therefore no justification for inferring that the observable 
earnings returns to education are higher only for later entrants. Actually, the population values 
for returns among later entrants and early birds could just as easily be the same, meaning that the 
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two groups could not be distinguished with respect to the effect of education. Together with the 
finding that the observed returns to education in the market sector as a whole are, in fact, 
significantly higher than those in the state sector, the effect of education could be higher for both 
market groups than the state group (despite the insignificant effect for early birds).  
 
General Advice and Revised Conclusion 
 
WX were led to a premature conclusion because they failed to systematically analyze all possible 
group differences. Such misinterpretations can be avoided by taking all possible contrasts into 
account (unless the pairwise differences are of no specific interest to begin with4). As illustrated 
above, one can do so by estimating a series of regression models in which the reference category 
is systematically varied. An equivalent but more efficient procedure is to perform so-called F-
tests for linear restrictions based on the estimates of just one of the models (such tests make use 
of the variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients; the interested reader is directed to Greene 
2003:95–99). The results of this procedure are displayed in Table 2, which contains values for 
the F-tests for all differences among the three groups in terms of earnings levels and/or returns to 
education. Again, it is apparent that any observed differences between early birds and later 
entrants do not approach statistical significance. Moreover, the p-values for comparisons 
                                                 
4 Sometimes, polytomous variables are merely used as control variables. In such cases, the single coefficients 
associated with the variable may not be of particular interest—especially if the number of categories becomes 
large—and one would probably be satisfied with testing only the overall effect of the variable (see, e.g., Fox 
1997:140–45). However, note that in any analysis a significant overall test is a prerequisite to a meaningful 
interpretation of the tests for single coefficients (in the present case, the overall test is significant). 
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between early birds and later entrants are of about the same size as the corresponding values for 
the comparisons between early birds and stayers. Taken together, these values indicate that a true 
difference between early birds and stayers is about as likely as a true difference between early 
birds and later entrants. 
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
 
Given these results, WX’s Hypotheses 1 and 2 can be rejected with approximately equal 
likelihood. There therefore appears to be no empirical justification for favoring Hypothesis 2 
over Hypothesis 1. If only one of these hypotheses is given credence, it should—at least if one 
adheres to the prescription of “Occam’s razor” (Thorburn 1918)—be the more parsimonious of 
the two: Hypothesis 1. The revised conclusion is thus that the market does pay off, or at least that 
it is not possible to show that it does not with the data at hand. This finding is further supported 
by the fact that the higher earnings returns to education in the market sector as a whole remain 
practically unaffected by the separation of the main effects for early birds and later entrants 
(results not shown). Hence, the introduction of the worker typology proposed by WX does not 
seem to have any effect on the estimated earnings returns to education in the market sector.5 
                                                 
5 Another significant problem with WX’s analysis is that they use a dubious operationalization of worker types. The 
typology is based on employment in either the state sector or the market sector in 1987 and 1996. While respondents 
who were not active in the labor force in 1996 are excluded from the analysis, WX implicitly classify the 
respondents who were not active in 1987 (mostly respondents who had not yet begun their occupational careers) as 
belonging to the state sector in 1987. This procedure is problematic because the younger cohorts are coercively 
classified as stayers or later entrants. If the respondents who could not be classified for 1987 (i.e. respondents who 
were not professionally active in 1987) are dropped from analysis (253 out of 1539 stayers and 121 out of 332 later 
 10
 
References 
 
Fox, John. 1997. Applied Regression Analysis, Linear Models, and Related Methods. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Greene, William H. 2003. Econometric Analysis. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson 
Education. 
Thorburn, W. M. 1918. “The Myth of Occam’s Razor” Mind 27:345–53. 
Wu, Xiaogang and Yu Xie. 2003. “Does the Market Pay Off? Earnings Returns to Education in 
Urban China” American Sociological Review 68:425–42. 
                                                                                                                                                             
entrants in our analysis), the difference in earnings returns to education between later entrants and early birds 
disappears almost entirely. This is further evidence against WX’s Hypothesis 2.  
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Table 1. OLS Coefficients from Multiple Linear Regression of Monthly Earnings on Selected 
Variables, Urban China, 1996 
 Model 1 
(Wu and Xie 2003) 
Model 2 
(replication of Wu 
and Xie 2003) 
Model 3 
(alternate 
specification of 
Model 2) 
Education (years of schooling) .047*** .048*** .109*** 
 (.006) (.007) (.022) 
Experience .013*** .015*** .015*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) 
(Experience)2/1000 -.167** -.209** -.209** 
 (.060) (.066) (.066) 
Party member (yes = 1) .149*** .144*** .144*** 
 (.037) (.037) (.037) 
Sex (male = 1) .216*** .224*** .224*** 
 (.038) (.038) (.038) 
Later entrantsa -.175 -.232  
 (.182) (.183)  
Early birdsa -.067 -.035 .197 
 (.249) (.253) (.256) 
Stayersa   .232 
   (.183) 
Later entrants × Education .056** .061**  
 (.019) (.020)  
Early birds × Education .025 .026 -.035 
 (.024) (.027) (.035) 
Stayers × Education   -.061** 
   (.020) 
Constant 5.230*** 5.185*** 4.953*** 
 (.116) (.111) (.215) 
Number of cases 2,060 2,057 2,057 
R2 .136 .142 .142 
Source: Survey of “Life Histories and Social Change in Contemporary China” of adults aged 20 to 69, 
1996. 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors adjusted for clustering. Data are weighted. 
a Based on the comprehensive measure of the market sector; “stayers” are the reference category in Model 
1 and 2, “later entrants” in Model 3; “market losers” (those who joined the market sector early and then 
left for the state sector) are omitted from the analysis because of the small number of cases they represent. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 2. Hypothesis Tests for Differences among Early Birds, Stayers, and Later Entrants 
Tests for Differences … Null 
hypothesis 
Observed value 
(standard error) 
F-value (degrees 
of freedom) 
p-value 
… in earnings levels (based on a 
model without interaction terms): 
    
– later entrants vs. stayers β6 = 0 .289 (.072) 15.88 (1, 49) .000 
– early birds vs. stayers β7 = 0 .195 (.230) .72 (1,49) .400 
– later entrants vs. early birds β6 – β7 = 0 .094 (.181) .27 (1, 49) .606 
…in returns to education (based on 
Model 2 in Table 1): 
    
– later entrants vs. stayers β8 = 0 .061 (.020) 8.88 (1, 49) .004 
– early birds vs. stayers β9 = 0 .026 (.027) .96 (1, 49) .333 
– later entrants vs. early birds β8 – β9 = 0 .035 (.035) 1.00 (1, 49) .322 
… in levels and returns (based on 
Model 2 in Table 1): 
    
– later entrants vs. stayers β6 = 0 
β8 = 0 
-.232 (.183) 
.061 (.020) 
11.23 (2, 48) .000 
– early birds vs. stayers β7 = 0 
β9 = 0 
-.035 (.253) 
.026 (.027) 
.57 (2, 48) .570 
– later entrants vs. early birds β6 – β7 = 0
β8 – β9 = 0 
-.197 (.256) 
.034 (.035) 
.49 (2, 48) .616 
Source: Survey of “Life Histories and Social Change in Contemporary China” of adults aged 20 to 69, 
1996. 
Notes: The displayed tests are robust tests adjusted for clustering. Data are weighted. 
 
